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In the United States, federal courts only have
jurisdiction to decide actual ‘cases or
controversies.’1 Thus, federal judges are not
constitutionally permitted to issue opinions on
matters that are moot. The 101-page decision by
United States Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm in
Lorraine v. Markel and American Insurance Co.2
aptly demonstrates the controversial nature in
issuing such advisory opinions. Here, Judge
Grimm was determined to issue this voluminous
treatise of an opinion, despite the fact that the
parties had advised the court that the case was
settled, so that there was no longer any need to
consider the pending motions that resulted in this
opinion.3 By publishing a judicial opinion, rather
than a law review article, Judge Grimm’s thoughts
on the admission of evidence take on the
weightier cloak of (an albeit unpublished)4
precedent. While the opinion is undoubtedly
useful in some respects as an academic primer on
the rules of evidence and the admission of
electronic evidence, such advisory opinions are
nonetheless to be discouraged.
Ironically, Lorraine involved the enforcement of an
arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act
(‘FAA’).5 Here, both parties moved for summary
judgment, which essentially admits that there are no
factual issues in dispute and that the matter may be
decided as a matter of law,6 seeking confirmation of
their interpretation of the arbitrator’s award, and the
arbitrator’s powers arising from the underlying
arbitration agreement.7 A federal court’s review under
the FAA is severely limited and federal courts rarely, if
ever, address the substance of the arbitrator’s opinion.
Thus, section 9 of the FAA states that any party may
apply to the court ‘for an order confirming the award
and thereupon the court must grant such an order
unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected . . ..’8
Notably, the court did none of those things in ruling on
the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.
Apparently, both parties attached directly to their
motions various e-mails as exhibits, together with other
printed documents that they believed were relevant to
interpreting the arbitration agreement. It should be
noted that certain federal district courts actually seem
to encourage such a practice,9 though it technically runs
counter to the requirement that summary judgment
motions be supported by affidavit.10 Moreover, the first
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2 2007 ILRWeb (P&F) 1805, 207 WL 1300739 (D. Md.
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3 As explained by the court in a February 6, 2007
letter ruling (on file with the author) that preceded
the opinion, the court was notified on February 2,
2007 that the matter had settled, and that the
parties had voluntarily dismissed the case. Despite
that notification, the court issued its letter ruling
nunc pro tunc to take effect on February 1, 2007.
4 But see Fed. R. App. Pro. 32.1: ‘A court may not
prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial
opinions, orders, judgments, or other written
dispositions that have been (i) designated as
‘unpublished’ . . . and (ii) issued on or after
January 1, 2007.’
5 9 U.S.C. § 1 and following.
6 Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56.
7 The plaintiff argued that the arbitration agreement
fixed the damages at $36,000, and that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding a
lesser amount once liability was established. The
defendant moved for confirmation of the
arbitrator’s award of only $14,000 in damages.
Hence, only $22,000 was at issue.
8 9 U.S.C. § 9.
9 For example, D.C. Colo. L.Civ.R. 56.1.
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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rule of evidence is that judges will generally consider
any evidence offered unless the opposing party objects
to its admission.11 Here, apparently, neither party
objected to the admission of the other party’s evidence,
which renders the court’s refusal to consider any of the
parties’ evidence somewhat odd.
Both parties relied substantially on e-mails between
counsel to support their opposing interpretations of the
arbitration agreement. Although the court refused to
consider any of the e-mails, it nonetheless decided that
a primer on the admission of electronic evidence
(whether e-mails or otherwise) was in order. Thus, the
court explained (Slip Op., at 7):
Given the pervasiveness today of electronically
prepared and stored records, as opposed to the
manually prepared records of the past, counsel must
be prepared to recognize and appropriately deal with
the evidentiary issues associated with the
admissibility of electronically generated and stored
evidence. Although cases abound regarding the
discoverability of electronic records, research has
failed to locate a comprehensive analysis of the many
interrelated evidentiary issues associated with
electronic evidence. Because there is a need for
guidance to the bar regarding this subject, this
opinion undertakes a broader and more detailed
analysis of these issues than would be required
simply to resolve the specific issues presented in this
case.
The opinion undoubtedly does provide an excellent
starting point for further research regarding the
admissibility of electronic evidence, although its
academic discussion of the evidence rules is largely
divorced from any practical application to the dispute
actually presented.
Judge Grimm begins his analysis by laying out five
standards that electronic evidence must satisfy:
(1) the electronic evidence must be relevant (under
FRE 401);
(2)the electronic evidence must be shown to be
authentic (under FRE 901);
(3)the electronic evidence must not be hearsay
(under FRE 801) or must otherwise fit within a
hearsay exception under FRE 803, 804, or 807;
(4)the evidence must constitute an ‘original’ under
the original writing rule, or if not, must be able to
be admitted pursuant to the secondary evidence
rules (FRE 1001-1008); and
(5)the probative value of the electronic evidence
must substantially outweigh any dangers of unfair
prejudice or any other factor identified in FRE 403.
Where neither party is given an opportunity to object or
explain why evidence is offered, such as in this case, it
can be difficult to determine these issues.
Judge Grimm’s most interesting discussion is likely to
be the authentication of electronic evidence. Contrary to
many decisions,12 Judge Grimm suggests that the
authentication of electronic evidence may require
greater proof than that required for paper documents,
such that courts will demand that proponents of
electronic evidence establish a more thorough
foundation than is usual when introducing paper
evidence. Judge Grimm also provides a very thorough
analysis of how hash marks and metadata can be used
to help authenticate electronic evidence. In particular,
he provides an almost step-by-step explanation (with
the citation of cases) of how to authenticate the most
common forms of electronic evidence (such as e-mail,
web pages, chat sessions, computer databases and
digital photographs), although seemingly only e-mail
communications were actually at issue in the motions
under consideration. Although Judge Grimm discusses
many means of authentication, he provides only the
briefest discussion of the means most commonly used
(and the means most likely applicable to authentication
of the actual evidence presented by the parties in this
case) – that is, stipulation of the parties or a request to
the opposing party to admit that the evidence is
authentic. Because of these commonly used
procedures, authenticity for most evidence is rarely an
issue.
Judge Grimm also provides a fairly academic
discussion of the hearsay rules, which he correctly
notes ‘are pervasive when electronically stored and
generated evidence is introduced.’ Especially with
strings of e-mails, there are likely to be portions that
constitute hearsay while other portions are not
hearsay.13 The court also discusses the various
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11 For example, Fed. R. Evid. 103, requiring timely
objection to admission of evidence to preserve
error; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61: ‘The court at every stage of
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding that does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.’
12 For instance, United States v. Bonallo, 858 F.2d
1427, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Siddiqi,
215 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998),
International Casings Group, Inc. v. Premium
Standard Farms, 358 F.Supp.2d 863, 874 (W.D.Mo.
2005) (all setting a relatively low threshold for
authentication of electronic evidence), but see In re
Vee Vinhnee, Debtor American Express Travel
Related Services Company, Inc. v. Vee Vinhnee, 336
B.R. 437 (9th Cir.BAP 2005) for a contrary view.
13 For a practical discussion of hearsay problems (and
solutions) with regards to the admission of chat
room ‘dialogue,’ see United States v. Burt, Case
No. 06-3415 (7th Cir. 7/26/07).
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exceptions to the hearsay rule pursuant to which
evidence might be admissible. It follows that the
application of such exceptions will depend on why the
evidence is offered, which again cannot be determined
in a vacuum. For this reason, the normal course of
proceedings in motions practice is that the opponent of
the evidence will raise the hearsay exception (via a
motion to strike) giving the proponent an opportunity to
explain to the court why the evidence is not hearsay.
Judge Grimm’s thorough explanation of the original
writing rule (the ‘Best Evidence’ rule) is again
interesting, but largely academic. The original writing
rule requires an ‘original to prove the contents of a
writing, recording or photograph unless secondary
evidence is deemed acceptable.’ Fed. R. Evid. 1001. As
with authenticity, however, objections based on the
original writing rule are rarely employed. (Indeed, even
the learned jurist admits that FRE 1003, which allows for
admissibility of copies unless there is either a genuine
issue as to authenticity of the original, or unfair
prejudice, has largely eliminated ‘best evidence’
objections.) Since authentication and original writing
objections are usually connected, most counsel will
determine in advance whether there is a problem, which
there rarely is with respect to copies. Nonetheless,
given the ease with which electronic evidence can be
innocently altered, Judge Grimm’s instincts are correct
that best evidence objections may become more
common when dealing with electronic evidence.
Oddly, given the context of the dispute, Judge Grimm
also spent time discussing Fed. R. Evid. 403, which
allows otherwise admissible evidence to be excluded
because its probative value is outweighed by the
potential for unfair prejudice or other harm to the
opposing party. This discussion, while thorough, is
completely academic in this context since neither party
was claiming that the other party’s evidence would in
any way unfairly prejudice it (beyond the obvious
prejudice of losing the case).
Unfortunately for the world of practicing attorneys,
Judge Grimm’s treatise on electronic evidence will be
considered authoritative by many more courts because
it was published as a judicial opinion rather than what it
really is – a law review opinion piece. While Judge
Grimm may be correct as to many of his points of law,
his discussion is almost completely divorced from any of
the issues actually presented by the parties in the case
under consideration. Such unnecessary digressions
regarding the admissibility of evidence that was not
even presented, simply makes the process of litigation
more expensive. While thorough, Judge Grimm’s opinion
seems to have lost sight of the overarching purpose of
the evidence rules, which is to promote ‘the end that
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined’ with a minimum of ‘unjustifiable expense
and delay.’14 The evidence rules simply cannot be
meaningfully applied in the absence of any ‘case or
controversy,’ which requirement was lacking here.
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